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2.1  Introduction 
Typically, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models predict that Mexi- 
co’s  gains from NAFTA  will be small. This is because Mexico has already 
opened the manufacturing sector of its economy, and U.S. and Canadian im- 
port tariffs are already very low. However, if NAFTA promised only a minimal 
gain for Mexico, why did President Salinas take such great pains in 1993 and 
1994 to ensure that the agreement was signed? Did Salinas simply ignore facts 
and knowingly waste political and financial energy on a useless project? We 
do not think so. We believe that the CGE models analyzing NAFTA’s effects 
have missed an essential element of the agreement: its role as a commitment 
mechanism. We  will  argue that the Salinas government’s ardent pursuit of 
NAFTA was motivated by the desire to ensure that necessary future economic 
and political reforms would be carried out. 
To fully understand NAFTA’s implications, one should view the agreement 
not as an isolated event, but as one part of the process of economic liberaliza- 
tion in Mexico. The exploration of this process provides three lessons that can 
be applied to other cases. First, deep reforms like trade liberalization are not 
likely to happen by government decree. Instead, they usually come about when 
the unanimous blocking of reform by powerful elites breaks down. In the case 
of  Mexico, this happened during a fiscal crisis, when some groups tried to 
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displace other groups in order to capture a greater share of fiscal revenue. Sec- 
ond, in the presence of entrenched elites, the sustainability of reform depends 
on the existence of new groups that benefit from the new status quo and have 
enough power to defend it. Thus, the speed of successful reform is determined 
by the speed with which new groups are consolidated. Initially, Mexico limited 
radical liberalization to the manufacturing sector. The government has only 
recently begun to undertake serious liberalization in the services and agricul- 
ture sectors. The third lesson we  take from Mexico is that the importance 
of  formal agreements like NAFTA  lies not so much in the ability of  these 
agreements to reduce average import tariffs among their parties and improve 
their terms of trade vis-&-,is  the rest of the world, as claimed by  the optimal 
tariff literature, but in their usefulness as commitment devices to force reforms 
to continue. 
Let us examine how the Mexican experience illustrates the first lesson. By 
the late 1960s, it was recognized in Mexico that the country had to abandon 
the import substitution development path it, like many other countries, had 
been following: trade and the economy had to be liberalized (see Ortiz Mena 
1970). No  strong steps toward liberalization were taken, however, until the 
debt and oil crises of the mid-l980s, when trade in manufactures was liberal- 
ized. This course of events presents a puzzle that has also arisen in the reform 
processes of  many other countries: why is it that deep reforms tend to take 
place during bad economic times (the mid-1980s for Mexico) but not during 
more favorable periods, like the oil boom years of the late 1970s, when adjust- 
ment costs are more affordable? The explanation we give in this paper is that 
as fiscal resources plummeted in the 1980s, the two powerful elites in the man- 
ufacturing sector-the  statist elite and the private import-competing elite- 
tried to weaken each other in order to gain access to a greater share of  fiscal 
transfers. The  statist elite induced expropriations, and  the  private elite re- 
sponded by inducing trade liberalization. This move was costly for the private 
elite in the short run because it forced a reallocation of fixed factors. At the 
same time, however, trade liberalization weakened the statist elite, as we will 
explain below. The private elite did not block trade liberalization in the 1980s 
as it had in the 1970s because in the 1980s its trade-off was not between trade 
liberalization and the status quo but between trade liberalization and being 
further expropriated. 
Now we consider the second lesson. In order to sustain reform, the Mexican 
government limited radical liberalization to the manufacturing sector. It did 
not radically restructure agriculture and services because alienating all power- 
ful groups in society could have derailed economic reform altogether. Instead, 
during 1985-94  the government focused its energies on forming new  coali- 
tions in the manufacturing sector-a  new export elite and a new group of for- 
eign investors-and  weakening the statist elite and the old private elite.’ The 
1. Throughout this paper we identify a group or elite by the fixed factors it controls, not by the 
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government accomplished the transformation of the power structure through 
privatization, deregulation, and the enactment of more friendly foreign invest- 
ment rules. 
Next we explore the third lesson, that NAFTA’s greatest importance lies in 
its use as a commitment device. NAFIA is a commitment by  the Mexican 
government to eliminate protection in agriculture and services within the next 
15 years (the agreement also entails a marginal reduction in protection for the 
already liberalized manufacturing sector) in exchange for a decrease in U.S. 
and Canadian protectionist barriers and a reduction in the uncertainty associ- 
ated with trade disputes. A formal agreement like NAFTA is very important 
for Mexico because radical liberalization of its economy (indeed, of any econ- 
omy) is bound to have  deep political effects. The ability of  Mexico’s ruling 
party (the PRI) to capture the agricultural vote has ensured its ability to pursue 
reforms in the manufacturing sector without major political obstruction. The 
broader liberalization promised by  NAFTA  will greatly erode this electoral 
machine because it will alienate the agricultural sector. In principle, one could 
argue that this imminent erosion will threaten the reform in two ways. First, 
uncertainty about the political future could tempt politicians in the future to 
delay further liberalization indefinitely. Second, there is the danger that when 
the PRI’s power erodes, new  political forces will arise and overturn the re- 
forms. In this paper, however, we argue that the policies implemented by for- 
mer presidents de la Madrid and Salinas make it very unlikely that such pessi- 
mistic scenarios will unfold. The first scenario is unlikely because NAFTA has 
already set the liberalization agenda; thus, it is not left to political discretion- 
this might be the reason Salinas pursued NAFTA  so feverishly. The second 
scenario is unlikely because, by  the time total trade liberalization has been 
implemented and the PFU  machine has eroded, the new export and foreign 
investment groups will have consolidated their power and will find it optimal 
to use their economic resources to ensure that the reforms do not get derailed. 
The bailout that the Mexican government received in early 1995 after the 
financial panic of December 1994 exemplifies the last point. Given that in early 
1995 Mexico did not have  enough liquidity to repay its dollar-denominated 
short-term debt, a default was likely. This default might have forced the govern- 
ment to follow inward-looking policies and increase anew the power of tradi- 
tional elites, risking the derailment of reforms. The network of U.S. firms with 
investments in Mexico used their political clout to induce an unprecedentedly 
speedy response from the U.S. government and international organizations. 
This support allowed Mexico to repay its short-term debt and even to resume 
borrowing in international markets by mid-1995. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2 we trace the evolution of 
trade protection and the tradable sector in Mexico during the past two decades. 
we do not necessarily mean that all persons belonging to that specific group were weakened or 
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In section 2.3, we examine some effects of trade reforms on the Mexican econ- 
omy. In section 2.4, we present a political economy interpretation of the Mexi- 
can reforms and expand on the three lessons discussed above. In section 2.5 
we analyze NAFTA. Finally, in section 2.6 we present our conclusions. 
2.2  Trade Liberalization 
In  1970 the Mexican economy was very protected. In that year, 65 percent 
of items in Mexico’s tariff structure were subject to import permits, and these 
items accounted for 59 percent of the total value of imports. By the late 1960s 
some voices were already calling for a change in this pattern. It was not until 
the mid-l970s, however, that the Mexican government initiated a mild program 
of liberalization, which substituted ad valorem tariffs for import permits. But 
despite these changes, the economy remained basically closed. At last, in 1979, 
it seemed that trade liberalization would soon be a reality. In that year, Presi- 
dent Lopez Portillo announced Mexico’s intention to accede to the GATT. A 
few  months later, however, after “consultations,” Lopez Portillo announced 
there would be no accession. Moreover, with the balance-of-payments prob- 
lems of the early 1980s, trade barriers were increased again, and Mexico be- 
came an almost impenetrable economy. By the end of  1982, 100 percent of 
imports were subject to permits. 
Finally, in 1985, the government announced accession to the GAlT as well 
as a new liberalization program. Since then, the opening process has continued 
without interruption. In 1985 the share of items in the tariff structure subject 
to import permits was reduced to 10 percent, and by  1994 the share was only 
1 percent. The opening is also illustrated by  the change in the percentage of 
total value of imports accounted for by imports subject to permits. This share 
fell from 83 percent in 1984, to 35 percent in 1985, to 10 percent in 1994, as 
shown in table 2.1. 
2.2.1  Manufactures 
Liberalization in the manufacturing sector took place very rapidly. In terms 
of nontariff protection, about 92 percent of domestic production in manufac- 
tures was covered by import permits in June 1985. By the end of that year, less 
than 50 percent of manufactures remained subject to import permits. By  1990, 
this indicator dropped to only 11 percent, leaving only a handful of products 
still subject to this kind of protection. Figure 2.1 traces this indicator for vari- 
ous industries between 1985 and 1990. It shows that by  1990 only the tobacco 
industry was substantially protected by an import license requirement, whereas 
the transportation equipment and food industries were mildly covered and in 
all other sectors protection had been entirely dismantled. 
Tariff protection also fell drastically after 1985. The average tariff rate for 
manufactured goods fell from 34 percent in 1985 to 14 percent in 1990. The 
industries that suffered the largest tariff reductions were the beverage, glass, 
apparel, footwear, and transportation equipment industries. Figure 2.2 traces 29  The Political Economy of  Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA 
Table 2.1  Indicators of Protection 
Domestic Product 
Covered  Imports 
by Import  Production-Weighted  Subject  Fraction Subject 
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Sources: SECOFI and unpublished information provided by Adrian Ten-Kate. 
average tariff rates for different industries from 1985 to 1990. Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 confirm that the opening process had profound effects on the entire manu- 
facturing industry (see also table 2.2). 
2.2.2  Agriculture 
Mexican agriculture is composed of two sectors: a traditional sector and a 
modem sector. The former remained closed until 1994. The modern sector, on 
the other hand, has been liberalized since 1987. This sector includes products 
such as tomatoes and citrus and tropical fruits. Mexico is highly competitive 
in the production of these goods. 
In the traditional agricultural sector, the two most important crops are maize 
and beans. These two products account for as much as 70 percent of Mexico’s 
arable land and for about 35 percent of  its rural employment. Historically, 
maize and beans have been fiercely protected. Until 1993, maize was subject 
to import permits and received a governmental support price well above the 
world market price (Levy and Van  Wijnbergen  1991 compute a 70 percent 
wedge). The argument for this protection is one of distributional equity: maize 
is the crop that generates the most rural employment (29 percent) and uses 
the most arable land (42 percent). The same argument has been used for the 
production of beans, which were also subject to import permits until 1993. 
Historically, Mexican agriculture has been protected mainly through nontar- 
iff barriers, usually import permits. Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the share 
of  agricultural and total output covered by  these permits. This figure shows 
that agriculture maintained a high degree of nontariff protection until very re- 
cently and that this sector was not affected by  the first set of  liberalization 
measures enacted in 1985. The reduction in the use of agricultural import per- Transportation Equipment 
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Fig. 2.1  Industrial output protected by import permits 
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Table 2.2  Manufacturing Industry Protection 
Output Protected by 
Import Permits (%) 
Average Tariff Rate 
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Source: Tybout and Westbrook (1995) 
mits, which started in 1987, initially left more than 60 percent of agricultural 
output still covered by import permits. Between 1987 and 1993, this indicator 
decreased steadily, though it was always above 45 percent (see table 2.3). 
On the other hand, tariff protection has played a relatively minor role in the 
history of the Mexican agricultural sector. Figure 2.4  shows the evolution of 
the average tariff for both agriculture and the whole economy between  1985 
and  1993. During this period, agriculture kept a relatively low but constant 
level of tariff protection (see table 2.3). 
Figure 2.5 summarizes the different patterns of liberalization between the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. This figure presents the import pene- 
tration rates by sector for the period  1981-91.  The pattern is clearly dual: the 
import penetration rate in agriculture remained relatively constant at about 10 
percent, while the same indicator for manufactures rose constantly from 28 
percent in 1985 to 59 percent in 1991. 
2.3  Effects of Trade Liberalization 
Trade liberalization had  a sizable effect on the volume of  trade. Exports 
increased from $3 billion in 1975 to $34.5 billion in 1994 (see table 2.4). The 
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Source: Unpublished information provided by Adrian Ten-Kate. 
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Fig. 2.5  Import penetration rates by sector 
Source: Unpublished information provided by Adrian Ten-Kate Table 2.4  Exports by Qpe of Good (millions of dollars) 
Oil Goods  Nonoil Goods 





















































































































































































Source: Banco de Mexico, Zndicadores Economicos (Mexico City, various issues). 35  The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA 
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Fig. 2.6  Exports by type of good 
Source: Table 2.4. 
increase from 1985 to 1994, however, is explained by an increase in manufac- 
turing exports. This is illustrated in figure 2.6, which charts the evolution of 
Mexican exports by  type of  good from 1975 to 1994. Oil exports reached a 
peak in 1982-84 and fell considerably starting in 1986. Manufactured exports 
began an upward trend in 1985, and by  1994 they were five times what they 
had been just 10 years before. Their share of total exports grew from 17 percent 
in 1982 to 70 percent in 1994. 
Imports also increased very rapidly during this period. They grew from $7 
billion in 1975 to $59 billion in 1994 (see table 2.5). Figure 2.7 shows how the 
composition of imports changed. Consumption imports grew relative to capital 
and intermediate goods imports. This suggests that producers of  consumer 
goods, which grew during the 1950s and 1960s,  have been hurt by trade liberal- 
ization. 
2.3.1  Production 
Trade liberalization induced important transformations within the manufac- 
turing sector. Figure 2.8 charts the production volume indexes for some indus- 
tries from  1980 to  1994. Figure 2.8A  presents the evolution of  some of  the 
industries that were hurt by  trade liberalization, such as tobacco, fibers and 
textiles, wood products, shoes, and electrical machinery. Figure 2.8B shows 36  Aaron Tornell and Gerardo Esquivel 
Table 2.5  Imports by Type of Good (millions of dollars) 






























































































































Source: Banco de Mexico, Indicadores Economicos (Mexico City, various issues). 
Note: Figures do not include imports from maquiladoras. 
the performance of some of the industries trade liberalization benefited, such 
as vehicles, engines and auto parts, glass, cement, and chemicals. With the 
exception of vehicles, no “winner” industry seems to have been hurt by  the 
1982 crisis. The vehicle industry, one of Mexican trade liberalization’s biggest 
success stories, is currently the most important contributor to Mexican manu- 
facturing exports. The adjustment this industry went through in the early 1980s 
allowed it to grow at a very high rate after 1987-not  coincidentally, the first 
high-tech auto plant became operational and exports of vehicles took off dur- 
ing this year (see Berry, Grilli, and Lopes-de-Silanes 1993). 
Contrary to popular predictions, trade liberalization did not destroy the Mex- 
ican manufacturing industry. Rather, it  seems that  the industry as a whole 
adapted relatively easily to the new competition. This is reflected in the com- 
position of Mexican external trade. Esquivel (1992) found that between 1981 
and 1990 the Grubel and Lloyd index of intraindustry trade increased from 28 
to 54  across all kinds of goods and that the same index for manufactured goods 37  The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA 
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Fig. 2.7  Imports index by type of good (1985 = 100) 
Source: Table 2.5. 
rose from 33 in 198  I to 63 in 1990. Figure 2.9 traces the evolution of this index 
for the one-digit categories of the Standard International Trade Classification. 
Table 2.6 shows that 72 percent of  the trade between Mexico and the United 
States in 1981 was predominantly interindustrial. By  1990, this situation had 
LIILLII~GU  lLLUlLLLll)’.  dUUUL  lldll  LIIG  pIUUULLS WGIG ULLUGU 11111dlllUUbLlldlly,  LLL- 
counting for 7 1 percent of foreign trade. 
2.3.2  Productivity 
Although many studies have been done on the subject, it is still not clear 
what the impact of trade liberalization on the productivity of the Mexican man- 
ufacturing industry has been. Most studies have found an overall productivity 
increase in the industry during the second half of the 1980s. Estimates range 
from 1.1 percent per year (Luttmer 1993) to 5 percent per year (Hernandez- 
Laos 1992). Clavijo (1992) found an increase in productivity of about 2.4 per- 
cent per year, while Qbout and Westbrook (1995) found an increase of  1.8 
percent per year. 
2.3.3  Foreign Direct Investment 
Until 1989 Mexico had been reluctant to accept foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a major element in its economic development. In 1973,  then-president 
Luis Echevema enacted an FDI law entitled “Law to Promote Mexican Invest- A  120 
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Fig. 2.8  Production volume index (relative to overall manufactures). 
A, Industries hurt by trade liberalization.  B, Industries benefiting from trade 
liberalization. 
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Fig. 2.9  Mexico-U.S. intraindustry trade index 
Source: Esquivel(l992). 
ment and Regulate Foreign Investment.” As the name indicates, this law was 
intended more to promote Mexican investment than to attract foreign invest- 
ment.*  In 1989, the government changed the regulations in an attempt to attract 
FDI. Specifically, the government lowered the high degree of discretion and 
removed the 49 percent ceiling on foreign capital in several sectors. 
Until 1983, with the exception of the peak years of the oil boom, FDI was 
not very important to the Mexican economy in terms of size, making up only 
about 10 percent of total investment. By 1987, the FDI flow was about 20 times 
what it had been in the early 1970s. At the end of  1993, with the passing of 
NAFTA by the U.S. Congress, there was a new increase in the flow of FDI to 
Mexico (see figs. 2.10 and 2.11). In fact, the amount of FDI in 1994 was about 
$8 billion, more than twice the average for the 1987-92  period. 
In  1994 the role of  FDI in the Mexican economy seemed to be more im- 
portant than ever. During the administration of Carlos Salinas (1988-94),  mul- 
tinational firms consolidated to form a major player in the economy. FDI’s 
share of gross fixed investment reached its highest ever (30 percent) in 1994, 
despite the major political difficulties Mexico faced that year. As of September 
2. According to some authors, the immediate effect of the 1973 law was to reduce FDI. Others 
argue that the negative effects are  not obvious and that there is not enough evidence to suggest 
that FDI was reduced. See Peres (1990). 40  Aaron Tornell and Gerardo Esquivel 
Table 2.6  Manufacturing Industry by Qpe  of Trade with United States 
Qpe  of Trade  1981  1990 
Intraindustry Trade 
Number of sectors 
Share of total exports (%) 
Share of total imports (%) 
Share of foreign trade (%) 
Number of sectors 
Share of total exports (%) 
Share of total imports (%) 
Share of foreign trade (%) 
Interindustry Trade 
46  82 
48.8  72.3 
19.8  70.7 
27.3  71.4 
104  84 
51.2  27.7 
80.2  29.3 
72.7  28.6 
Source: Esquivel(l992). 
Note: Sectors  with a Grubel and Lloyd index of intraindustry trade above 50 percent are considered 
to have intraindustrial trade. The Grubel and Lloyd index is defined as Br = 1 -  (IX, -  M,I)  I  (X, 
+ MJ,  where X,  and M,  are exports and imports of sector i. 
1993, firms with FDI accounted for 27 percent of formal employment in the 
manufacturing sector and for almost 100 percent of employment in the metallic 
products, machinery, and equipment sector (see Secretaria de Comercio y Fo- 
mento Industrial [SECOFI] 1994). 
2.4  A Political Economy Interpretation of the Mexican Reforms 
NAFTA is just one part of the process of liberalization of the Mexican econ- 
omy. To fully understand  NAFTA, it is necessary to consider the entire se- 
quence of liberalization events that have taken place in Mexico during the past 
decade. Before presenting our argument we summarize the main facts (dis- 
cussed in other sections) that we want to rationalize: 
It had been evident since the late 1960s that Mexico had to abandon its im- 
port substitution strategy and liberalize trade. However, attempts to liberalize 
trade and implement a fiscal reform during the 1970s were unsuccessful. For 
instance, in  1979, President Lopez Portillo announced that Mexico would 
accede to GATT, but after “consultations” he announced in 1980 that Mexi- 
co’s economy would remain closed. 
Surprisingly, in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the 1930s and 
in the wake of Mexico’s most damaging earthquake in this century, President 
de la Madrid (1982-88)  announced Mexico’s accession to GATT in  1985. 
By 1987, trade in manufactures was liberalized. 
Trade liberalization did not destroy the manufacturing sector, although it did 
induce a strong reallocation within that sector. 
Trade liberalization in manufactures was followed by a tax reform, a radical I0 
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Fig. 2.10  Flows of foreign direct investment 
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privatization program, a deregulation program, and a structural transforma- 
tion of the economy during President Salinas’s administration (1988-94). 
Also during Salinas’s presidency, Mexico made two radical breaks with the 
past. First, it eased restrictions on foreign investment. Second, it enacted a 
major constitutional change in land tenure legislation. 
Unlike in manufactures, there was no across-the-board liberalization of trade 
in agriculture and services during the Salinas administration. 
During the last part of his presidency, Salinas made NAFTA the main policy 
objective of  his  administration.  His efforts to have Mexico accede to the 
agreement generated significant political and economic costs. 
NAFTA is a commitment by Mexico to a future total liberalization of trade 
in agriculture and services in exchange for easier access to the United States 
and Canada for Mexican goods. 
We will address the following questions about the Mexican reforms. First, 
we ask why trade liberalization took place in the economically and politically 
strained environment of the 1980s instead of during the oil boom years when 
Mexico more easily could have afforded such reform. Second, why did the 
Salinas government pursue NAFTA so feverishly? What were the expected 
gains from accession, given that Mexico had already liberalized trade in manu- 
facturing, U.S. tariff levels were quite low, and NAFTA entailed significant 
costs? Third, why did the government decline to completely open trade in agri- 
culture and services early on, given that this measure would have reduced input 
prices and made manufactures more competitive? 
More generally, we hope to derive broad lessons from the Mexican reform 
process. In particular, we will address the questions of when trade liberaliza- 
tion is most likely to take place, under which conditions it is most likely to be 
sustainable, and what the role of a formal agreement like NAFTA is in sus- 
taining a reform process. 
2.4.1  Historical Background 
Let us first present a brief historical overview to put the Mexican reform 
process in perspective. The Mexican political system centers on a president 
who has many formal powers but cannot be reelected and on an official party 
(first called PNR, then PMR, and now PRI) that has won every presidential 
election for the past 60 years. The Mexican president, however, is by no means 
an all-powerful autocrat, nor is the PRI a monolithic party in which everyone 
follows the president’s instructions. The roots of this political structure can be 
found in the process of Mexico’s state formation. During the 1920s, Mexico 
was basically in a state of anarchy: several powerful local elites and armies 
held  the  only  real  control  over  each  region.  After  president-elect  Alvaro 
Obregon was assassinated in 1929, then-president Calles formed the PNR as 
an emergency  agreement with powerful groups and local bosses  across the 
country to comply with the formalities of  presidential elections (see Meyer 43  The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA 
1978). In  several states, the existing bosses (caciques) and parties agreed to 
franchise the PNR name but did not yield any effective power to the central 
government. The state of Chiapas is a clear example of this. 
The process of state formation, which paralleled the formation of the official 
party,  consisted  of  transforming the  independent  local  armies  and  power 
groups of each region into members of a national corporation. In order to in- 
duce them to accept this corporatization, the government conferred on these 
groups monopoly rights over certain industries or geographical areas in ex- 
change for loyalty. This consolidation process was enforced by  an aggressive 
industrialization policy centered on import substitution and the undertaking of 
large infrastructure projects that generated significant rents for these groups. 
In addition, the government granted generous tax exemptions and implemented 
favorable wage policies. 
President Cardenas (1934-40)  took this corporatization process one step 
further. First, he implemented an ambitious land reform through the ejido pro- 
gram. This program gave the right to use land (but not ownership rights) to a 
vast number of peasants and absorbed the defeated peasant movements (Zapa- 
tistas) into the political corporation, minimizing the risk of future  rebellion^.^ 
Second, the government gained control of  the labor movement through the 
Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), which is still a pillar of 
the PRI. Last, the military was incorporated into the party (see Hernandez- 
Chavez 1979). 
These policies generated social peace  and  high growth from the  1940s 
through  the  1960s. A  by-product was  the entrenchment of  powerful  rent- 
seeking groups. By the late 1960s one could distinguish two elites in the manu- 
facturing sector: the private import-competing elite and the statist elite. In ad- 
dition, the regional bosses who controlled the PRI voting machine and distrib- 
uted government subsidies to agricultural production constituted a rural elite. 
The statist elite was composed of networks associated with state-owned enter- 
prises, such as managers, union leaders, and suppliers. 
2.4.2  Why Did Trade Liberalization Occur? 
We turn now to the puzzle of why trade was not liberalized during the 197Os, 
when it was considered necessary (Ortiz Mena 1970) and when economic con- 
ditions could have  supported it, but was instead enacted in the midst of  the 
economic crisis of the mid-1980s. As discussed above, the political system in 
Mexico is such that no president had the autonomy to liberalize trade by de- 
cree, since such liberalization implied the dismantling of  a major part of the 
3. The ejido is a communal tenure system that prohibits the selling of  land. This program limits 
peasants’ access to credit and improvements in production and, in the long run, undermines ag- 
ricultural productivity. Ultimately, the rural sector was polarized into two sectors, a modem and 
highly productive agricultural sector with large-scale operation and access to exports markets and 
a backward sector formed mainly by ejido lands that remained isolated and scarcely linked to the 
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apparatus that generated rents for the strong elites. Therefore, in rationalizing 
trade liberalization events, we must bear in mind that government actions do 
not reflect only the will of an all-powerful autocrat, nor are they solely deter- 
mined by the will of a majority of atomistic voters. In addition to those of the 
president and the people, the interests of powerful elites exert a major influence 
over government  actions. In all likelihood, all three interests influence  most 
political events. In this paper, however, we will emphasize the role of powerful 
elites. That is, we will explain the events in Mexico solely as the outcome of a 
game among powerful elites. We will assume that the president can take action 
and implement reform only if it is not blocked by powerful local elites. 
As mentioned above, in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, there were two strong 
groups  within  the  Mexican  manufacturing  sector:  the  private  import-com- 
peting elite and the statist elite. The political process guaranteed both elites 
almost unlimited access to fiscal revenue. They enjoyed subsidized inputs and 
profited from convoluted regulations and strict trade barriers, which increased 
the profitability of the fixed factors they owned. So why did these manufactur- 
ing sector elites not unanimously block trade liberalization in the economically 
strained  1980s as they had  done during the  1970s boom? The argument by 
Tornell (1995) addressed this issue-the  following is a summary of that ar- 
gument. 
To understand the process that led to trade liberalization, think of both the 
private import-competing elite and the statist elite as interacting in a preemp- 
tion game. At every instant, each group has the opportunity to eliminate the 
other group’s power by incurring a once-and-for-all cost. The group that incurs 
this cost becomes the “leader” and attains the power to monopolize fiscal trans- 
fers in the future. The other group becomes the “follower” and loses all access 
to future fiscal transfers. If  both  groups  incur the cost simultaneously,  that 
is, if they “match,” both see their power to extract fiscal revenue diminished, 
but neither one loses relative to the other. The cohabitation equilibrium that 
sustains the status quo breaks down when the payoff of becoming the leader 
exceeds  the  payoff  of  maintaining  the  status quo. Moreover,  if  the  payoff 
of matching is greater than the payoff of following, then both groups weaken 
each other. In this case, the government becomes relatively autonomous and 
is not beholden to elites anymore. Therefore, it becomes free to implement a 
reform. 
But when does the payoff of becoming the leader exceed the payoff of  re- 
maining in the status quo? To address this issue we note that all payoffs are 
functions of  the fiscal revenue available for redistribution. As fiscal revenue 
declines, the marginal utility  of  gaining a greater share of  it increases. Thus 
the payoff of leading increases relative to the payoff of remaining in the status 
quo, and the payoff of  matching increases relative to following. For a suffi- 
ciently big decline in fiscal revenue the payoff of leading becomes greater than 
the payoff of the status quo, and the payoff of matching becomes greater than 
the payoff of following. As a result, each group tries to displace the other in 45  The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA 
order to get a greater share of  the lower fiscal revenue. Hence, when fiscal 
revenue is low, the status quo collapses and the potential for reform exists. 
Now we apply this argument to the Mexican experience of the 1970s and 
1980s. After the students’ riot of  1968 the government of President Echeverria 
(1970-76)  tried to reestablish legitimacy and assuage demands for a reduction 
in poverty and income inequality by expanding public investment. This expan- 
sion  significantly strengthened the  statist elite. Although Echeverria had  a 
strong antibusiness rhetoric, he did not take any measure to reduce the rents 
received by  the private import-substituting elite. For instance, in 1971 he tried 
to implement a tax reform to increase tax revenues, which made up 8 percent 
of GDP, but he soon abandoned that move. Also, in 1973 Echeverria enacted a 
law that limited foreign investment, benefiting the private elite. 
Echeverria’s antibusiness rhetoric created a strain between the government 
and the private sector. President Lopez Portillo, elected in  1976, set out to 
relieve this strain. After the 1977 discovery of significant oil reserves, and after 
the price of oil had increased, the government enacted a free-for-all fiscal pol- 
icy that benefited both elites. The increase in fiscal transfers showed up in the 
form of an increase in government expenditures, from 10 percent of GDP in 
1970 to 22 percent in  1982. An  example of increased transfers to the private 
sector was the 1981 half-billion-dollar bailout of Grupo Alfa, the biggest pri- 
vate company in Mexico at the time. Other specific actions funded by  the 
expansion included the acceleration of the investment program in government- 
owned enterprises, the subsidization of oil, gas, and electricity prices, and the 
establishment of  an ambitious antipoverty program, the Mexican Alimentary 
System (SAM). SAM, which supported grain production and was intended to 
benefit the poorest citizens of  Mexico, provided subsidies that were mostly 
captured by the rural elite (Fox 1992). Lopez Portillo’s expansionary policies 
caused the fiscal deficit to jump from 10 percent of GDP in 1977 to 17 percent 
in 1982. 
During the 197Os, fiscal revenue remained high enough to finance all this 
additional government spending. Government subsidies increased the profit- 
ability of  fixed factors owned by  the  statist elite  and  the  private  import- 
substituting elite. The elites were satisfied with the transfers they were receiv- 
ing, so no powerful group had an incentive to push for the structural reforms 
that were needed. During the boom years of the 1970s, no group found that the 
benefit of ensuring itself a large share of future fiscal revenue outweighed the 
short-run costs of weakening the other groups. Therefore, all powerful elites 
unanimously blocked reform during those years. 
During the 1980s, falling oil prices and an interruption in foreign lending 
forced cutbacks in Mexico’s generous government transfer programs-fiscal 
revenue could no longer cover the demands of all interest groups. This reduc- 
tion in the size of  the pie increased the marginal utility of gaining a greater 
share of  it and increased the payoff of becoming the “leader” (recall the pre- 
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The statist elite made the first move, inducing the government to expropriate 
all Mexican private banks. The banks channeled much fiscal revenue to the 
private sector (through subsidized credit and implicit guarantees of their bor- 
rowings from foreign banks), and their owners constituted one of the strongest 
groups in the private elite. Lopez Portillo announced the banks’ expropriation 
in September 1982, three months before he left office, in a dramatic address to 
Congress during which he cried over his failure to help the poor. Simultane- 
ously with the expropriation of the banks, capital controls were imposed and 
Miguel Mancera, orthodox governor of Mexico’s Central Bank, resigned. The 
private sector responded to these blows by  announcing that a national strike 
would take place on 8 September, but representatives canceled the strike a few 
days later.4 
The private import-competing elite matched  the statist elite’s first move. 
Aware that trade liberalization would be a mechanism by which they could 
destroy the power of the statist elite, the private elite did not oppose trade 
liberalization in the 1980s as it had in the 1970s. This time, the private elite’s 
choice was not between trade liberalization and the protectionist status quo, 
but between trade liberalization and becoming the follower, which would mean 
being further expropriated by  the statist elite. When President de la Madrid 
took office in December 1982, members of the private elite feared that under 
his tenure expropriations would continue and statism would increase-after 
all, he had been minister of budget and planning under Lopez Portillo  and 
had budgeted the massive increase in investment in state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover,  de la  Madrid  assumed the presidency  before  the Thatcher and 
Reagan revolutions repopularized free market policies. 
Trade liberalization  has been  painful  for the private  sector in that it has 
forced many firms into bankruptcy and has forced fixed factors to be reallo- 
cated, both of  which have generated short-run adjustment costs. In addition, 
the private elite has lost the rents from protection it received before liberaliza- 
tion. Because of  reallocation,  it has also suffered from the loss of political 
power associated with the ownership of  fixed factors in well-established indus- 
tries. The extent of  these reallocation  costs was illustrated in the previous 
section. 
Despite these drawbacks for the private elite, trade liberalization could dras- 
tically reduce the power of the statist elite to further expropriate the private 
elite and extract fiscal subsidies. This would occur through three channels. 
First, free trade will create new powerful groups of exporters and foreign in- 
vestors with incentives to defend the new status quo. Thus, an expropriation 
would draw opposition not only from those new export groups but also from 
4.  It has been argued that the expropriation of the banks was really a bailout. Indeed, the banking 
system was insolvent, and the government took over all of  its liabilities. However, the point we 
want to stress in this paper is that the bankers lost the “right” to operate banks and thus lost access 
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foreigners. Since the potential cost of confronting powerful foreign firms will 
be high, it is unlikely that the government will engage in further expropriations. 
Second, free trade abolished the complex system of import licensing and mul- 
tiple tariffs, replacing it with one or two rates that apply across the board. This 
more transparent  system quickly highlights  rent-seeking  behavior, allowing 
other groups to block such behavior right away. Last, agreements signed by a 
country as part of  trade liberalization  (such as GATT and NAFTA) impose 
limits on the extent of subsidization to specific industries and rent-generating 
regulations that a government can impose. 
Ultimately, both elites became weaker and worse off after the expropriation 
of  the banks  and trade liberalization. It is important  to note that there was 
no uncertainty beforehand that this would happen. Both groups induced this 
outcome because, as a result of decreased  government revenue in the early 
1980s, the payoff of unilaterally deviating from the status quo at that time by 
trying to become the leader exceeded the payoff of maintaining the status quo. 
Note that the Coase theorem does not apply in this case because there is no 
third party with the power to enforce an agreement between the two elites. 
2.4.3  Reform of the State 
Once both groups in the manufacturing sector weakened each other, the de 
la Madrid and Salinas governments  attained “relative autonomy.” They used 
this autonomy to implement a tax reform, a radical privatization program, and 
a deregulation program that eliminated many privileges and monopolies con- 
ferred during the consolidating years of the PRI. 
The puzzling point we wish to highlight and the one we will try to rational- 
ize is that these governments did not fully liberalize agriculture and services. 
From an economic standpoint, this is an incongruity. If a government’s objec- 
tive is to promote manufactured exports, the right policy is to liberalize agricul- 
ture and services. Liberalizing  agriculture frees unskilled  labor and reduces 
unskilled wages. Liberalizing services reduces interest rates, transport costs, 
and communication costs. Since unskilled labor and services are inputs in the 
manufacture of exports, the government would certainly promote exports by 
liberalizing agriculture and services, thereby driving down the costs of these 
inputs. 
Why did the two governments choose not to follow such obviously advanta- 
geous policies? Our next point is that the decision not to open trade in agricul- 
ture and services fully was necessary to ensure that the reform process would 
not be derailed. Reformers needed two things to continue pursuing reform. 
First, they had to be reelected, which could be difficult given that initially the 
reform did not have much support in the population. Second, they had to avoid 
alienating all powerful groups simultaneously. With respect to the first require- 
ment, reelection, the reformers depended heavily on the rural vote in the 1988 
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had damaged the urban electoral machine and elections in urban areas had 
become more contested. With respect to the second requirement, delaying lib- 
eralization of  agriculture and services allowed the government to avoid alie- 
nating all powerful elites simultaneously, while building new elites to support 
the new strategy of export promotion and private property. 
Let us elaborate on the  first requirement, the issue of  reelection. A few 
months before the presidential elections of 1988, some members of the statist 
elite who had split from the PRI combined with leftist parties to form the Par- 
tido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) and captured a third of the vote. 
Also, the private elite increased its involvement in politics following the 1982 
expropriation of the banks. This involvement broke the private elite’s implicit 
agreement with the government by which the private elite stayed out of politics 
and the government in turn ensured a profitable investment climate (see Max- 
field and Anzaldua  1987).  As a result, elections in urban areas became more 
contested. Therefore, the PRI had to rely more on the rural electoral machine 
to win presidential elections. For instance, Salinas, who received 50.5 percent 
of the total vote, won only 34 percent of the votes in “very urban” areas, while 
he received 77 percent in “very rural” areas (see Fox 1994).  The rural electoral 
machine is closely linked to the network that  administers protection  to the 
agricultural sector. Opening trade in agriculture and thus dismantling this pro- 
tectionist network might have destroyed the rural machine, and with it the pres- 
idential hopes of reformers like Salinas and Zedillo. 
To expand on the second requirement above, one can view the second parts 
of the de la Madrid administration and the Salinas administration as having 
been devoted to creating new elites that would support the export promotion 
and private property strategy. Two new elites were formed under these adminis- 
trations: the private export elite and the foreign investors elite. Deregulation, 
privatization, and new rules for foreign investment were used as instruments 
in promoting these elites. Deregulation eliminated the convoluted rules that 
allowed some groups to enjoy monopoly rents (on this see Fernandez 1995). 
Through privatization, the government transferred to the new private elite vir- 
tually all the firms in the manufacturing sector, with the exception of the energy 
sector. Through less discretionary  rules  the government attracted  a signifi- 
cantly greater amount of  FDI than it had historically. These actions further 
weakened both the statist elite and the old private import-competing elite. 
Several investors who had not been in the big leagues during the 1970s and 
1980s were able to acquire government assets that transformed them into what 
one might call “new strong groups.” The steel industry illustrates this point. 
Before privatization there was only one private integrated  steel producer in 
Mexico-Hylsa  (a subsidiary  of Alfa,  beneficiary  of  the  1981 bailout  dis- 
cussed above). After the privatization of the steel sector, the relative power of 
Alfa diminished drastically-now  it is only one among five major steel pro- 
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a small mining group, and a Dutch steel producer; IMSA, a group of former 
medium-sized steel processors; ISPAT,  a group from India; and Villacero, a 
group of  former medium-sized steel traders. It is interesting to note that in 
response to the increased competition induced by privatization, Alfa recently 
opened a new steel plant that is internationally competitive. Prior to privatiza- 
tion, it is likely that Alfa would simply have  sought more protection and re- 
ceived it, threatening to close down if it did not. Today, shutdown threats from 
a single steel producer could not effectively induce protection because other 
domestic producers are available to fill the employment and production gaps a 
shutdown would create. 
Another indicator of the dilution of power within the private elite that Sali- 
nas’s reforms have brought about is the increased number of Mexican billion- 
aires. According to Forbes, there was only one billionaire family in Mexico in 
the late 1980s-the  Garza Sada family, Alfa’s major shareholder. In 1994, there 
were 24 Mexican billionaires, according to Forbes. Outstanding examples are 
Roberto Gonzalez, Carlos Slim, and Salinas Pliego. Gonzalez developed the 
market for tortilla flour and is the biggest producer of tortillas in the United 
States. In the recent privatization of the banks he acquired Banorte. Slim con- 
trols Telefonos de Mexico, the telephone monopoly, in association with South- 
western Bell and France Telecom. Salinas Pliego is the top Mexican retailer of 
household appliances. He recently bought  from the government Television 
Azteca and has a joint venture with NBC, which makes him the only private 
competitor of Televisa, Mexico’s other television network. It is worth noting 
that 10 years ago none of these men were billionaires-they  did not even rank 
among the country’s richest. 
We  should clarify that the new elite was not formed totally by newcomers: 
in fact, many of  its members had familial or historical links to the old elite. 
The important point is that the new group is defined not by the historical back- 
ground of its members, but by their interest in defending the new set of prop- 
erty rights. This common interest is in turn determined by  the fact that they 
own and control fixed factors whose profitability depends on exports. 
Summing up, the policies followed by  the government during the period 
1985-94 (trade liberalization, deregulation, opening to FDI, and privatization) 
had the effect of weakening the statist elite and the private import-competing 
elite and inducing the formation of two new powerful groups: the export elite 
and foreign investors. Since these new elites will benefit from the new set of 
property rights that has been imposed, once their power is consolidated in the 
near future they should expend resources to ensure that these property rights 
are maintained. 
We  should emphasize that the executive branch has played a critical role in 
this process as a coalition builder, not as an authoritarian central planner. This 
does not mean that the administrations of  de la Madrid and Salinas did not 
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regime that would support an efficient export economy. Important examples of 
their efforts in this direction are the tax reform, the privatization program, and 
the deregulation program. 
2.5  NAFTA 
As we will describe in subsection 2.5.2, most CGE models predict gains for 
Mexico from NAFTA on the order of  1-3  percent of steady state GDP. When 
capital inflows are allowed, possible gains increase to 5-8  percent. Would even 
an 8 percent increase in steady state GDP be worth the sizable costs President 
Salinas was willing to incur to ensure NAFTA’s approval by the U.S.  Congress? 
The answer is probably  no. We think that CGE models’  predictions fail to 
capture all the benefits derived from the role of NAFTA as a commitment de- 
vice and therefore tend to underestimate the benefits of NAFTA. 
As we will describe in subsection 2.5.1, trade liberalization in services and 
agriculture will not be immediate but will happen gradually over the next 10 
to 15 years. This gradual liberalization will be a blow to the elite associated 
with traditional  agriculture, which derives its power from the distribution of 
subsidies to inefficient producers. This is a serious concern because the PRI 
vote comes largely from rural voters, and to a great extent, the agricultural elite 
controls the  machine that produces this  vote. Thus, trade liberalization will 
destroy an important part of the PRI voting machine over the next decade. This 
creates a good deal of uncertainty about who will gain power in the future. The 
Chiapas uprising on 1 January  1994, the day on which NAFTA was enacted, 
symbolizes this uncertainty. Regardless of whether the uprising originated in 
the peasantry or was induced by an elite that opposes trade liberalization, it 
proved that there are opponents to the new regime (see Hinestrosa and Tor- 
nell 1994). 
The uncertainty regarding who will  gain political control once the PRI’s 
agricultural voting machine is weakened will make it politically expedient to 
delay indefinitely further liberalization or to derail reform altogether. Our point 
is that NAFTA is the commitment device that will ensure that such delay will 
not occur and that reform will continue. This will happen in two ways. First, 
there are huge political and economic costs associated with breaching an inter- 
national  agreement  such  as  NAFTA.  Second, NAFTA will  consolidate  the 
power of the new export groups that have an interest in defending the new set 
of property rights. 
NAFTA will benefit and strengthen the new Mexican export elite for two 
reasons. First, it will facilitate the establishment of links with foreign firms 
interested in the maintenance of policies that support free trade. Second, it will 
allow the Mexican export sector to grow faster and become a bigger player in 
the domestic arena. NAFTA will achieve this outcome by reducing the uncer- 
tainty generated by trade disputes and by facilitating U.S.  and Canadian access 
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can exports more competitive. Liberalizing trade in agriculture will increase 
the supply of unskilled labor, thus reducing the real wages of unskilled workers 
(Venables and Van Wijnbergen 1993); liberalizing trade in services will reduce 
interest rates, transport costs, and communication costs. 
By the time the reforms stipulated by NAFTA take effect, the new export 
groups should have already consolidated their power. Thus, they should be able 
to defend the new status quo, ensuring that reform is not derailed in the transi- 
tion. The new groups will be able to defend the new status quo in several ways. 
For instance, they can finance the campaigns of politicians who favor the status 
quo as opposed to expropriation and inward-looking policies. Also, should the 
government  in place try  to renege on reforms, they  can finance  opposition 
groups. Thus, regardless of what parties form and win elections in the future, 
they will find it costly to alter the development path established by the de la 
Madrid-Salinas  regime. Thus, once the new groups have consolidated their 
power, the probability of  derailment will be very small. 
The bailout that the Mexican government received  in early 1995 after the 
financial panic of December  1994 exemplifies this point. Given that in early 
1995 Mexico did not have enough liquidity to repay  its dollar-denominated 
short-term debt, a default was likely.5  This default might have forced the gov- 
ernment to follow inward-looking policies  and increase anew the power of 
traditional elites, risking the derailment of reforms. The network of U.S. firms 
with investments in Mexico used their political clout to induce an unprecedent- 
edly speedy response from the U.S. government  and international organiza- 
tions. Within a few weeks approximately $50 billion in credit lines and loan 
guarantees was in place. This support allowed Mexico to repay its short-term 
debt  and  even to resume  borrowing  in international  markets  by  mid-1995. 
Moreover, the Mexican government responded to this crisis with an accelera- 
tion of the privatization program and the opening of the financial system. The 
fact  that  the  U.S. network  used  its  power  to  save Mexico from a reform- 
endangering situation suggests that Salinas was successful in inducing the cre- 
ation of groups that would defend the reforms begun by de la Madrid. 
2.5.1  What Is NAFTA? 
When NAFTA was enacted on 1 January  1994, tariffs for about half of  all 
import categories were eliminated immediately. Most of the remaining tariffs 
will disappear within a period of 5 years, and only a few of  them will remain 
in effect for a maximum period of  15 years. In  1993, the  average Mexican 
tariff was about 12 percent while the average U.S. tariff was about 4 percent. 
Therefore,  in  terms of  tariff  reduction,  the  expected  changes  are relatively 
small and the bulk of the reductions will be in tariffs on Mexican imports. Still, 
NAFTA includes restrictions that will reduce the impact of tariff reduction on 
Mexican products. These measures are aimed at compensating Mexico for the 
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obvious asymmetry in  level of  development among the three countries in- 
volved. 
Agriculture. Agriculture is heavily protected in all three countries. But, while 
farmers are a very small fraction of  the U.S. and Canadian labor forces (3 
percent in the United States and less than 5 percent in Canada), as much as 26 
percent of the Mexican labor force is dependent on agriculture. This suggests 
that the Mexican economy will face very significant adjustment problems as a 
result of NAFTA. In those cases where import licenses were still present, they 
were replaced by  ad valorem tariffs. For instance, tariff protection on corn, 
wheat, and beans will be phased out over a period of  10 to 15 years. 
Textiles. Quota restrictions on Mexican textile imports from the United States 
will be  removed gradually over a  10-year period. In  this sector the rules of 
origin will play a very important role in deciding which exports are eligible to 
be traded. 
Automobiles. In the automobile sector, Mexico will immediately eliminate its 
tariffs on light trucks and reduce by 50 percent tariffs on passenger cars. The 
remaining tariffs will be phased out over a period of 10 years. In this sector, 
rules of origin were negotiated such that a minimum 62.5 percent North Ameri- 
can parts and labor content will be required for access to the benefits from the 
agreement (compared to the 50 percent requirement under the Canada-U.S. 
agreement). Importing used cars from the United States into Mexico will be 
allowed in 10 years. 
Financial Sector. Initially, there will be some restrictions on the financial sector 
in Mexico. Individual firms will face a cap of  1.5 percent of  the market, and 
on the aggregate, Canadian and U.S. financial firms will face a ceiling of  8 
percent. This aggregate cap will gradually increase until the year 2000, after 
which most of the restrictions will disappear, unless foreign firms have more 
than 25 percent of the market and the Mexican government decides to apply 
some restrictions. 
Side Agreements. The Free Trade Commission was established by NAFTA to 
supervise the implementation of the agreement and to resolve disputes about 
its interpretation. In addition, there will be binational panels for the resolution 
of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. These side agreements 
will further reduce uncertainty in trade relationships among the three countries 
involved, which from the Mexican standpoint is one of  the most important 
issues. 
NAFTA does not entail either free labor mobility or environmental harmoni- 
zation requirements. There are, however, supplemental agreements on labor 
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American  Development Bank. The two  supplemental agreements state that 
each country will have the right to determine its own regulations but must 
commit itself to ensuring their correct implementation. 
2.5.2  Computable General Equilibrium Models of NAFTA 
The basic conclusion of CGE models is that NAFTA will have small welfare 
effects. These models suggest this because for the most part they do  not include 
the effects on foreign investment and because import tariffs in Mexico (at least 
in the manufacturing sector) have already experienced a steep decline, because 
a structural transformation has already occurred (between  1987 and 1993) in 
Mexico and because tariff rates in the United States and Canada are already 
low. Here we summarize the results of these models. 
According to Brown (1992), these models can be grouped in three catego- 
ries: static models with constant returns to scale technology and perfectly com- 
petitive goods markets, static models with increasing returns to scale, and dy- 
namic models. In the first set of models the predicted effects are as follows. If 
there were a removal of tariffs only, Mexico’s real income would increase by 
0.11 percent. If the agreement were to include nontariff barrier reduction, the 
predicted gain would vary between 0.3 and 2.28 percent. If, in addition, we 
allow for an increase in capital inflows, Mexico’s real income could increase 
between 4.6 and 6.4 percent (or 6.8 percent if we also allow for endogenous 
migration). Most of  these models also predict an increase in the trade deficit 
with both the United States and the rest of the world. The predicted effects 
range from an increase of 0.33-1.49  percent if no capital inflows are consid- 
ered to an increase of 6.6 percent in the case of capital inflows. 
The second set of models allows for increasing returns to scale and therefore 
a non-perfectly  competitive  market  structure.  Its predictions  are similar to 
those of the first set: effects on Mexican real income range from  1.6 to 3.3 
percent depending on the market  structure and are as much as 5 percent if 
capital  inflows are allowed.  Predicted  effects on employment are bimodal: 
some models predict effects ranging from 1.7 to 2.4 percent; others predict an 
increase between 5.1 and 5.8 percent. 
Finally, the last group of models predicts gains for Mexico ranging from 0.6 
to 2.6 percent. When there is a reduction in the interest rate (as a result of  a 
lower degree of uncertainty) from 10 percent to 7.5 percent, these models pre- 
dict gains for Mexico as high as 8.1 percent of steady state real income. 
2.6  Conclusions 
In retrospect, the sequence of reform policies adopted in Mexico is fascinat- 
ing. No step resulted from the decree of an all-powerful autocrat, and each step 
both had the support of a powerful group and generated new powerful groups 
that would support further reforms. 
The first step was to liberalize trade in manufactures. The government under- 54  Aaron Tornell and Gerard0 Esquivel 
took this action not as soon as it realized its necessity, but only when the una- 
nimity of  the powerful groups within the manufacturing sector broke down in 
the  1980s. The second step was to consolidate the power of  emerging elites 
with an interest in export promotion, an objective that the government achieved 
through privatization and deregulation. The third step in the sequence was the 
signing of NAFTA, and the fourth step will be actually to dismantle protection 
in the agricultural and services sectors. 
The trade liberalization process was not a historically predetermined out- 
come, but was brought about largely through the decisive contributions of  for- 
mer presidents de la Madrid and Salinas. De la Madrid recognized the window 
of opportunity created by the economic hardships of the mid-1980s and began 
liberalization at the start of his administration. He also recognized the limita- 
tions of  this opportunity and did not try to liberalize the entire economy. Sali- 
nas consolidated the power of the new export group and, by signing NAFTA, 
committed Mexico to total liberalization in 15 years. 
Chances are that if all these steps had been taken at once, Mexico’s powerful 
groups would have colluded and blocked the reform. We can see this from the 
Venezuelan experience, an interesting contrast to the Mexican one. In  1989- 
92, Venezuelan president Carlos Andres Perez tried to implement many  re- 
forms simultaneously. All the powerful groups in the population opposed him, 
forcing him to resign. His successor, President Caldera, backtracked on many 
of Perez’s reforms. 
NAFTA should be understood as a commitment device that guarantees there 
will be no delays in the continuing reform process. This commitment device, 
combined with the influence of the new elites that benefit from export promo- 
tion, greatly increases the likelihood that trade liberalization in  Mexico will 
not be derailed. 
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1-48. 
Comment  Wontack Hong 
According to Tornell and Esquivel, trade liberalization, deregulation, privatiza- 
tion (excluding oil firms), opening to  foreign direct investment (FDI) with new 
rules, and the formation of NAFTA during the period 1985-94  have weakened 
the  private  import-competing (PIC)  elites  and  the  state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) elites within the manufacturing sector and at the same time have in- 
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duced the formation of new export elites and FDI elites that are taking advan- 
tage of  the government’s new set of property rights. These new elites, once 
their power is consolidated in the near future, are expected to have strong in- 
centives to defend the new rules of the game. Tornell and Esquivel have indeed 
mentioned that many of the new elites have links to the old elites. And yet, 
their emphasis is still on the problem of new elites defending new property 
rights in face of old elites trying to derail the liberalization program. The real 
curiosity is why the traditional elites have not themselves more actively at- 
tempted to expand the scope of their operations into the new export activities 
or to form strategic alliances with FDI. Were there any political or institutional 
barriers that inhibited traditional elites from converting themselves into new 
elites, in spite of the wealth and power they had accumulated over the past 
several decades? 
By creating new billionaires,  the Mexican government seems to have re- 
duced the concentration  of economic power, making the Mexican economy 
more competitive and enhancing the sense of participation at least among the 
narrowly limited upper classes. Has there been any effort to spread the sense 
of participation down to small entrepreneurs by lowering entry barriers against 
labor-intensive export production activities? 
If there occurs liberalization of  trade in agricultural and service sectors ac- 
cording to the timetable set by NAFTA, one might well expect input prices 
(including the wages of unskilled workers) to fall and the manufacturing sector 
to become more competitive. On the other hand, it is likely that ejido agricul- 
ture (which constitutes the mainstream rural vote) will be completely ruined 
and that the services sector will be dominated by FDI. Tornell and Esquivel 
state that even a gradual liberalization would be a blow to the elite associated 
with traditional agriculture. However, there have been fairly productive large- 
scale non-ejidu agricultural sectors that maintain access to export markets. One 
may have to examine the possible impact of liberalization on this large-scale 
non-ejido agriculture. If an export orientation enhances the interests of the non- 
ejido agricultural elite, then they too must be examined systematically, together 
with the interests of the SOE, PIC, export, and FDI elites in manufacturing. 
According to Tornell and Esquivel, NAFTA was not established to increase 
the bargaining power of  North America against the rest of the world; it was 
simply a product of Mexican internal politics and was aimed to transform the 
Mexican economy into a truly market economy. This view might represent a 
Mexican perspective, but I am not so sure that it can represent the U.S. per- 
spective. 